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ABSTRACT 
The Air Force view of Personnel Recovery (PR) has historically focused almost 
exclusively on Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) of downed aircrews.  Recent 
operations have seen a marked decrease in aircraft shootdowns, and have correspondingly 
tasked USAF Combat Rescue forces with non-CSAR missions in support of a variety of 
customers.  This thesis examines the changing environment in which Combat Rescue 
forces are employed; evaluates the ability of these forces to perform PR tasks within an 
Irregular Warfare campaign; and makes recommendations regarding where and under 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report identifies Afghanistan and Iraq as 
indicative of the shift in warfare from major conventional combat to multiple, 
asymmetric operations.1  While Air Force Combat Rescue forces are specifically 
organized, trained, and equipped for major combat operations, their role in current and 
future Irregular Warfare remains ad hoc and ambiguous.  While highly capable, rescue 
forces lack an integrating vision of their potential contribution to the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT).  As a result, they remain underutilized and marginalized within the 
theater air component.  Overcoming this obstacle will require a broader focus on 
Personnel Recovery (PR) within the Air Force, and a willingness to commit fully to PR in 
an Irregular Warfare environment – to include placing Combat Rescue forces under the 
tactical control of other components or agencies. 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
17 January 2002 was a watershed day in the history of Combat Search and Rescue 
(CSAR).  It marked the first “save” awarded to US Air Force (USAF) Combat Rescue 
forces in combat since the end of the Vietnam War.  The previous thirty years had seen 
the gradual atrophy and dismemberment of these forces until, on the eve of the first Gulf 
War, they essentially possessed no combat capability.  Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
were tasked to provide CSAR coverage for downed aircraft, to mixed reviews and to the 
detriment of their primary missions in support of special operations.  This trend continued 
throughout the 1990s, when SOF again provided CSAR alert in the Balkans.2  In all, SOF 
recovered five downed aircrew in combat operations. 
USAF Combat Rescue forces, however were slowly being rebuilt during this 
time, and would eventually replace SOF in the no-fly zones surrounding Iraq.  For several 
years, very expensive and highly trained forces stood by, ready to launch at a moment’s 
                                                 
1 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006),  vii. 
2 Lee K. dePalo, “USAF Combat Search and Rescue: Untapped Combat Power,”  (Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Air University Press, 2005),  6. 
2 
notice to rescue any downed Coalition aircrew in Iraq.  The continuous alert coverage 
took its toll on the small fleet of specialized, Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) 
aircraft3, and rescue crews repeatedly had the highest deployment rates in the Air Force.  
While thankfully none of the aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones was ever shot down, 
Combat Rescue crews provided an ever-present insurance policy.  This policy came at a 
price, however.  The constant cycle of deployment to sit ground alert reduced aircrew 
retention, lowering the experience levels in rescue units, and hampered the ability to 
conduct normal flying training.  These were cited as contributing factors in a tragic mid-
air collision between two HH-60s in September 1998.4  It was not until the months 
following 9/11, however, that Combat Rescue forces would employ in actual combat in 
Afghanistan.   
The combat environment, however, was unlike anything these forces had trained 
for; there was no enemy air force or air defense system to contend with.  The high, 
rugged terrain and poor visibility limited aircraft performance and demanded extreme 
flying skill.  And most importantly, there were no lines to define enemy and friendly 
territory.  The rescue forces settled into their new bases in and around Afghanistan and 
waited. 
When the call came, it was not for downed pilots.   
Instead, CSAR forces extracted stranded special operators; evacuated critically 
wounded Afghan and US soldiers in weather conditions in which other aircraft were 
unable to fly; and brought Afghan children who had been injured to US forces for help.  
On the night of 17 January 2002, the call was for an Australian SF soldier injured in a 
minefield.  Three pararescuemen (PJs) jumped out of a rescue HC-130 at 10,000 feet, at 
night, into a minefield.  Landing safely, the PJs treated the soldier until rescue HH-60s 
arrived to evacuate them.  The crews involved were recognized with a combat save. 
This incident began a new trend for Combat Rescue forces; their missions no 
longer resembled the traditional CSAR aircrew recovery.  The rescue crews’ long-range, 
                                                 
3 LD/HD assets include rescue, AWACS, certain reconnaissance, and special operations aircraft. 
4 Jamie McIntyre, “A deadly helicopter accident and the debate on military readiness,” Cable News 
Network, [website]; available from http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/09/06/military.readiness/; Internet; 
accessed 29 September 2007. 
3 
rapid response, willingness to fly in poor conditions, and the PJs medical expertise placed 
them in high demand for exfiltration and MEDEVAC – but not from the air component 
that controlled them.  As there was little threat to allied aircraft, the rescue forces became 
a force in search of a way to contribute to the overall theater campaign.  The air 
component, however, did not share Combat Rescue’s enthusiasm for an expanded 
mission.  Per doctrine, the rescue forces provided CSAR alert coverage for air component 
assets.  If another component needed rescue support, it could make a request through the 
Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC), where its priority was evaluated against other 
alert requirements before the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) 
allowed use of its rescue forces. 
Events in Iraq proceeded in a similar fashion.  Combat Rescue forces were 
deployed in massive numbers for IRAQI FREEDOM, and rescued a total of one F-14 
crew that ejected after suffering mechanical failure.  Most of the rescue forces were 
redeployed at the end of major combat operations, but those who remained faced a 
familiar lack of utilization.  Unlike the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, where Army 
helicopter weather restrictions pressed Combat Rescue into MEDEVAC service, the 
more benign conditions of Iraq made even MEDEVAC missions a rarity.  During a seven 
month span in 2004, the crews sitting CSAR alert did not receive a single tasking.5  
Despite this, Combat Rescue forces still maintain CSAR alert in Iraq today. 
Doctrinally, the shift in focus away from downed pilots was codified 2005, when 
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, Combat Search and Rescue Operations, was 
renamed Personnel Recovery Operations.  The doctrine recognizes that although 
recovering downed airmen is important, the ability to recover personnel of all 
components (and civilians) contributes to the overall campaign – particularly in Irregular 
Warfare.6  But the doctrine still emphasizes the importance of the CSAR task force – 
fundamentally unchanged since Vietnam – as the basic construct for employment, 
ignoring the environmental realities that exist on the modern battlefield.   
 
                                                 
5 dePalo, 12. 
6 United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations, 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, 1 June 2005),  xx. 
4 
B. WHAT IS PERSONNEL RECOVERY? 
Personnel recovery is a blanket term that encompasses several methods of 
returning isolated persons in distress to friendly control.  Joint Publication 3-50, Joint 
Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, provides the following definition: 
Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil 
efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. 
Isolated personnel are those US military, DOD civilians, and DOD 
contractor personnel who are separated (as an individual or group) from 
their unit while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or 
mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, 
evade, resist, or escape.7 
Options for conducting PR can be diplomatic (through Department of State or 
other negotiating bodies), civil (via private citizens or non-governmental organizations), 
or military.  While typically only the physical “rescue” portion is considered, PR consists 
of five essential tasks:  Report, Locate, Support, Recover, and Reintegrate.8  For the 
purposes of this study, we will consider mainly the “recover” function of PR.  The range 
of military recovery categories and methods typically available are shown in Figure 1.  
Under current guidance, the individual joint force component commanders are 
responsible for the planning and conduct of PR operations within their areas (or as tasked 
by the Joint Force Commander [JFC]).9  The responsibility for organizing, training, and 
equipping PR forces, however, remains with the individual Service Chiefs.10  The 
services, including US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), use slightly different 
methods to effect recovery: Combat Search and Rescue used by the Air Force and Navy; 
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), used by the Marines, which is 
similar to CSAR but also includes physical recovery of disabled aircraft via heavy-lift 
helicopters; Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), which typically involve Special 
Forces-controlled networks of friendly agents; and Hostage Rescue, the province of elite 
SOF units. 
                                                 
7 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-50, Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery 
(Second Draft), (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 May 2005),  I-1. 
8 AFDD 2-1.6, 6-7. 
9 Joint Pub 50-3, II-5. 
10 Ibid., II-9. 
5 
 
Figure 1.   Personnel Recovery Options, Categories, and Methods (From Joint Pub 50-3) 
 
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations, further 
expounds that “CSAR is the Air Force’s method of choice for accomplishing the 
recovery task in uncertain, denied, or hostile environments.”11  Recovery forces are 
traditionally marshaled into a CSAR Task Force (CSARTF) composed of rotary- and 
fixed-wing recovery aircraft with dedicated ground rescue specialists; fighter escort 
aircraft to neutralize air and ground threats, termed RESCAP and RESCORT 
respectively; airborne command and control; and tanker support.  These so-called “gorilla 
packages”, developed during the Vietnam War, are designed to reduce the threat enough 
to allow helicopters to enter the area and pick up survivors.12 
                                                 
11 AFDD 2-1.6, 10. 
12 Ibid., 13. 
6 
CSAR can thus be seen as a specific subset of a larger PR construct.  The Air 
Force is the only service that possesses a force specifically designed to conduct a PR 
mission (CSAR) – and only that mission.  The USAF Combat Rescue forces are 
comprised of active-duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units assigned to 
Air Combat Command in the CONUS, or Pacific Air Forces or US Air Forces Europe 
overseas.  These units employ HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters as a recovery vehicle; 
HC/MC-130P extended range refueling and support aircraft; and Guardian Angel 
pararescuemen and Combat Rescue Officers (CROs) who provide the linkage from 
aircraft to isolated personnel. The terms CSAR force, rescue force, and Combat Rescue 
will be used interchangeably to refer to those USAF forces charged with conducting the 
CSAR portion of Personnel Recovery. 
 
C. PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
Previous research on CSAR has focused mainly upon command and control of 
rescue forces during joint operations and how best to support the Joint Force Commander 
rather than individual components.13  While some of these reports have made 
recommendations on where rescue expertise should reside (USAF or USSOCOM), the 
rationale were based primarily on similarities between missions and providing an 
economy of force.  Absent from this discussion, however, has been an examination of the 
mission’s underlying environment and the significant changes that this environment has 
undergone.   A change in the fundamental nature of rescue operations requires a re-
evaluation of the ways and means by which these operations are conducted.   
The goal of this thesis is to examine the evolution of the CSAR mission and the 
current asymmetric or “irregular” environment in which it operates; identify what 
capabilities airpower brings to Irregular Warfare, and how they relate to Personnel 
Recovery tasks; and evaluate potential ways the air component can better utilize the 
existing Combat Rescue force, providing a more unified vision of the role of Personnel 
Recovery in supporting national strategy and theater objectives in Irregular Warfare.   
                                                 
13 See Timothy R. Minish, “The Joint Rescue Task Force: Dedicated CSAR Capability for the Theater 
CINCs,” (Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, 14 June 1998), and Darren T. Hansen, 
“Combat Search and Rescue: Should it be a Joint Requirement?” (Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War 
College, 5 February 2001), for more comprehensive for discussion of joint employment constructs. 
7 
II. HISTORY OF CSAR 1990-2001 
The failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, Operation EAGLE CLAW, highlighted 
a glaring lack of long-range special operations airlift capability.  The Air Force’s answer 
was a program known as “Forward Look”, which transferred all of the Aerospace Rescue 
and Recovery Service’s (ARRS) newest aircraft, the HH-53 Pave Low, and their HC-130 
tankers to special operations units.14  While the concept was designed to provide theater 
commanders with a capabilities-based force that could conduct CSAR and special 
operations, the Air Force fought to keep the CSAR mission while USSOCOM sought to 
divest it.15  The ARRS maintained responsibility for CSAR, but no longer possessed any 
combat capable aircraft.  It was hardly surprising that SOF would ultimately be tasked 
with providing recovery forces to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
 
A. DESERT STORM 
1. Composition of Rescue Forces 
As planning progressed to counter the Iraqi forces, it quickly became apparent 
that the rescue forces required to execute air operations were in effect non-existent.  This 
led CENTCOM commander General Norman Schwarzkopf to place recovery missions 
under the purview of the only component with sufficient rescue expertise and forces – 
SOCCENT.  The special operations component was given the primary responsibility for 
conducting CSAR in support of Coalition forces in hostile territory.  SOF aviation fell 
under the direction of Colonel George Gray, the commander of the 1st SOW, and his 
director of operations, Colonel Bennie Orrell.  Colonel Orrell was a career rescue 
helicopter pilot, and had been awarded the Air Force Cross for a rescue over Laos in 
1972.16  The CSAR effort would be in the hands of seasoned experts who knew what a 
helicopter was – and was not – capable of doing in combat. 
                                                 
14 Darrel D. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University Press, 2006), 27. 
15 United States Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM History, 1987-2007,”  [document 
online]; available from http://www.socom.mil/Docs/Command_History_ 26Feb07webversion.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 13 May 2007, 19.  
16 Darrel D. Whitcomb, “The Non-Rescue of Corvette 03,” Air and Space Power Journal (Spring 
2004) : 104. 
8 
Upon arrival, the rescue forces immediately assumed CSAR alert duty.  CSAR 
was SOCCENT’s highest priority; other special operations taskings were secondary.  The 
use of highly-specialized and very expensive equipment for ground alert duties instead of 
SOF support drew ire from within SOCOM, but the forces were tasked in accordance 
with the theater commander’s priorities.17  MH-53Js from the 20th SOS and MH-60s 
from the 55th SOS provided 24-hour CSAR alert coverage for the duration of the war, 
with at least four aircraft available at all times.18  Further support was provided by the 
Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.  MH-60s from the 3/160th 
maintained CSAR alert at forward locations in concert with the AFSOC helicopters.19 
The Navy provided organic CSAR coverage for Coalition forces over the Gulf, 
but also detailed aircraft and crews from its reserve rescue units, HCS-4 and HCS-5, to 
SOCCENT to augment the CSAR effort – to include a SEAL detachment to assist in 
recoveries.20  
The final piece in SOCCENT’s CSAR umbrella was composed of EUCOM forces 
operating in Turkey.  Designated PROVEN FORCE, the SOF component provided MH-
53s and MC-130s to cover CSAR operations north of the 33rd parallel.21 
Colonel Orrell and other rescue veterans had learned a hard lesson about 
helicopter survivability in Vietnam and at Koh Tang Island during the USS Mayaguez 
rescue attempt.  Charging into a high threat area for a rescue attempt was only going to 
result in the loss of more assets, with helicopters being the most vulnerable; an analysis 
of the existing threat relative to the survivor’s location was necessary before launching a 
mission.22  SOF planners attempted to mitigate this by preparing potential routes 
throughout Iraq to be used on short notice.  These air corridors went throughout the areas 
of Iraq that a helicopter would be able to penetrate.  The planners also sectioned Iraq into 
areas where daylight rescue would be possible, where rescue was only possible at night,                                                  
17 Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 48. 
18 Minish, 20. 
19 “Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 160th SOAR, [website]; available from  
http://www.nightstalkers.com/ history/desert.html; Internet; accessed 25 August 2007. 
20 Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 64. 
21 Ibid., 74. 
22 Darrel D. Whitcomb, The Rescue of BAT-21, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 151. 
9 
and where rescue would be unlikely due to the threat.23  To preserve his valuable assets 
from misuse, Colonel Gray required that radio contact be established with a survivor and 
their location known before his helicopters would be launched for a CSAR mission. 
2. Command and Control of Rescue Forces 
Although the Air Rescue Service (ARS) did not have aircraft to support DESERT 
SHIELD/DESERT STORM, they did have personnel to man the theater Joint Recovery 
Coordination Center (JRCC).  The JRCC was to work directly for the J-3 on the CINC’s 
staff.  Their job was to ensure integration of effort among the various components in 
theater.  In addition, any mission beyond any component’s abilities was referred to the 
JRCC to direct.  Each component was also expected to have organic forces available for 
rescue missions at the JRCC’s request, yet each maintained operational control for launch 
of its own forces.24 
The JRCC was located within the air component’s Tactical Air Control Center 
(TACC).  Although the JRCC still worked for the CINC and not the air component, the 
TACC provided the best and most up-to-date information about ongoing air missions and 
would most likely be the first to learn of a shoot-down.25 The TACC also handled most 
of the additional assets (especially A-10s) that would form a CSARTF. 
Per doctrine, operational control (OPCON) of special operations assets would 
remain with SOCCENT for the duration of the campaign.  Those forces tasked for CSAR 
alert would be under the tactical control (TACON) of the JFACC only after launch.  The 
determination to launch the helicopters, however, remained with the special operations 
component and the criteria that they had established.  The JRCC, as a coordination 
element, could request support from each component, but could not order it.26 
3. Slate 46 
At approximately 0320z on 21 January 1991, Slate 46, an F-14 crewed by 
Lieutenants Devon Jones and Larry Slade, was downed by an SA-2 surface-to-air missile.  
Initially, it was reported that two aircraft had been downed, and the JRCC passed the                                                  
23 Joe E. Tyner, “AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalries for Combat Rescue Partnership 
Tomorrow,” (National Defense Fellows Research Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1996), 39. 
24 Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 60. 
25 Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: Berkley, 1999), 394. 
26 Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 61. 
10 
tasking on to SOCCENT.  The alert forces at ArAr, Saudi Arabia, began planning for the 
recovery mission.  Due to poor weather at ArAr, the all-weather MH-53s were chosen as 
recovery vehicles.27 
Commanded by Captain Tom Trask, Moccasin 05 launched through the heavy fog 
to the reported coordinates, along with A-10 Sandy aircraft and F-15 coverage.  When the 
weather began to clear inside of Iraq, Trask searched the target area in vain until forced to 
return to ArAr to refuel.  At 0905z, Sandy 57, Captain Paul Johnson, made voice contact 
with Jones and was able to verify his location.  Trask and an additional MH-53 returned 
to the area while the Sandys refueled from an airborne tanker.  After tanking, the A-10 
rejoined with the helicopters and guided them to Jones’ location.  As the helicopters 
prepared to execute the pickup, Iraqi trucks rapidly approached the survivor.  The A-10s 
destroyed the first truck while the second fled the area.  Trask landed as Jones broke from 
his hiding spot and was brought aboard by the PJs.  The package turned to the south and 
egressed back into Saudi Arabia.  The rescue of Lieutenant Jones was the first successful 
combat recovery since Vietnam.28 
4. Corvette 03 
The most controversial CSAR event of the war began on 19 January when 
Corvette 03, an F-15E crewed by Colonel Dave Eberly and Major Tom Griffith, was shot 
down by an SA-2 while flying a counter Scud mission.  Eberly and Griffith ejected 
safely, and were able to link up on the ground.  The flight lead radioed the approximate 
position that Corvette 03 had gone down, but there was no radio contact with the crew.  
JRCC passed this information on to SOCCENT.  The location was well north of the 33-
30 line and near the Syrian border, in am area well-defended by AAA and SAMs.  
Colonel Gray felt that the best chance of recovery would be PROVEN FORCE executing 
the mission out of Turkey, and proceeding through Syrian airspace to avoid Iraqi 
threats.29 
                                                 
27 Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 151. 
28 Jeffrey S. Michalke, “Commando Heritage,”  1st Special Operations Wing, [website]; available 
from http://www. af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070110-237.pdf 1/10/2007; Internet; accessed 9 July 
2007. 
29 Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 126. 
11 
While SOCCENT was awaiting diplomatic approval from Syria, other flights 
continued in the same area.  Eberly and Griffith made brief radio contact with one of the 
strike groups, but the crews – who had not been briefed that there was a crew down – did 
not realize who they had heard.30 
That evening, another package, led by Griffith’s squadron commander, heard 
Griffith’s voice on the radio, and assured the JRCC that it was definitely Corvette 03.  
The F-15E crews were becoming more and more upset about a perceived lack of action 
by the JRCC and SOCCENT in launching rescue forces.  They expected that all available 
assets would be directed to assist with recovery, as they had in Vietnam.  When they 
requested sending a package of F-15Es specifically to find Eberly and Griffith, they were 
told that the F-15Es were needed striking other targets, specifically the politically-
sensitive Scud launchers.31 
After tapes of the radio transmissions had been reviewed, Colonel Gray approved 
the mission.  PROVEN FORCE MH-53s and tankers planned to launch and fly through 
Syria before entering Iraqi airspace.  The reported coordinates of the survivors varied by 
as much as twenty miles, which complicated the mission.  The helicopter crews would 
attempt to make radio contact while flying in the general vicinity; if no response was 
received, they would egress back into Syria.  Diplomatic clearance had not yet been 
granted, but the crews prepared to launch without it.32 
The rescue force launched that evening as scheduled, and eventually received 
clearance into Syria well after they were already in the airspace.  The helicopters reached 
the target area and searched for 30 minutes without successful radio contact.  Each 
attempt to use the radio was greeted by bursts of intense AAA.  Dejected, the helicopters 
egressed the area and the package returned to Turkey.  The crews did not know that 
Eberly and Griffith had been captured that day while attempting to reach the Syrian 
border on foot.33 
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5. Benji 53 
Benji 53, an F-16 piloted by Captain Scott Thomas, began experiencing engine 
trouble while returning from a reconnaissance mission in Iraq on 17 February.  When his 
engine seized, Thomas ejected and landed safely, still sixty miles into Iraq.  His 
wingman, 1st Lieutenant Eric Dodson, verified Thomas’ location and made radio contact 
with him.  He relayed the information to AWACS for rescue coordination.  As his fuel 
ran low, Dodson returned to base as an F-15E flight was diverted to Thomas’ location. 
Upon landing, Dodson was dismayed to hear rescue forces had not been launched.  
The alert forces at King Khalid Military City (KKMC), composed of MH-60s from the 
3/160th, had not been told that positive contact had been made with Thomas.  Dodson 
personally assured them that it had, and Chief Warrant Officer Tom Montgomery led a 
two-ship recovery into Iraq.  AWACS helped vector the helicopters into the area, and 
Thomas used his infrared strobe to signal his location when he was unable to make radio 
contact.  Montgomery spotted it, and soon had Thomas on board for the low-level return 
to KKMC.34 
The rescue of Benji 53 was the only successful night rescue of the war, executed 
by forces highly experienced in NVG operations.  While there had been some grumbling 
early on about using SOAR assets for CSAR alert instead of traditional insertion and 
extraction missions, the attitude after Thomas’ rescue was decidedly more upbeat.35 
6. Bengal 15/Mutt 41 
Mutt 41, piloted by Captain Bill Andrews, was the flight lead of a four-ship of F-
16s providing close air support to Army forces near Basra on 27 February.  Andrews was 
shot down by enemy fire and captured immediately after ejected.  An OA-10 in the area 
relayed Andrews’ position, but did not witness his capture.  When JRCC and SOCCENT 
plotted the position relative to the Republican Guard units in the area, they immediately 
decided that a rescue mission was out of the question.  The threat was simply too high.36 
Word that no rescue would be launched made its way through the Battlefield 
Control Element to the ground forces, who decided through a series of 
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miscommunications, to attempt their own rescue with Apaches and a Blackhawk.  
Despite repeated warnings from strike aircraft and forward air controllers in the area not 
to allow a helicopter in for a pickup, the Blackhawk, Bengal 15, was shot down, killing 
five crewmembers.  Three others were captured immediately.  The ground fire was so 
intense that the two Apaches had to return to base.  No further attempts at rescue were 
made.37 
SOF attempted two other, unsuccessful rescues of aircrew (Stroke 65 and Jump 
57); both involved searches during daylight and were accompanied by RESCORT 
aircraft.38  In all, 38 aircraft were lost; seven CSAR missions were launched, resulting in 
three saves (the third was Wolf 01, an F-16, whose pilot ejected over the Persian Gulf and 
was rescued by USN helicopters). 
The special operations forces in theater proved capable of performing the CSAR 
mission when feasible.  CSAR alert coverage was provided constantly throughout the 
war; at no time were forces unavailable or given conflicting special operations taskings.39  
Although there was criticism of the criteria that SOCCENT used prior to launching a 
mission, the experience of Bengal 15 highlights that there were indeed areas that 
helicopters could not operate.  None of SOCCENT’s assets were lost during rescue 
operations.  This also demonstrates the desirability for experienced SOF commanders to 
exercise control over their forces.  While USAF Brigadier General Buster Glosson told 
his fighter pilots that there was nothing in Iraq worth dying for, he also told them that he 
would “stack helicopters on top of each other and get them all shot down” if required to 
rescue them.40  If the helicopters had been under the operational control of the JFACC, it 
is possible that there might have been a faster response – but it is just as likely that assets 
would have been committed to situations where their capabilities were not understood, 
with resultant losses.  SOF assets on alert did not hesitate to fly during daylight hours, 
and routinely flew with A-10 or F-16 RESCORT aircraft.  Contrary to popular belief, 
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CSAR forces launched on missions with nothing more than a coordinate and loitered for 
long periods of time, including during daylight, in enemy territory.41   
 
B. POST-DESERT STORM OPERATIONS 
SOF units remained engaged in CSAR coverage for the various operations that 
followed DESERT STORM, including DESERT CALM and SOUTHERN WATCH in 
the southern no-fly zone, and PROVIDE COMFORT and NORTHERN WATCH in the 
northern no-fly zone.42  In April of 1995, when USAF F-15s shot down two US Army 
Blackhawk helicopters over northern Iraq, MH-60 crews on CSAR alert flew a 15-hour 
marathon mission to recover the bodies of those killed.43  This constant deployment 
demand – for a mission that was not a SOCOM priority – greatly restricted the ability of 
AFSOC units to maintain currency and readiness for their primary missions.44  Combat 
rescue units, now armed with the new HH-60G Pave Hawk, would eventually take over 
these operations and maintain constant CSAR alert coverage until the invasion of Iraq in 
2003.  The small rescue forces were similarly hampered by the deployment requirements; 
they routinely surpassed USAF goals for annual days deployed and training levels fell 
below acceptable combat standards.45  SOF units were tasked to cover shortfalls in rescue 
capability as late as 2000.46  No allied aircraft were lost over Iraq between 1995 and 
2003. 
 
C. DENY FLIGHT 
With re-tooled rescue forces tied up in no-fly zone CSAR coverage in Iraq, SOF 
was again tasked for providing theater rescue coverage in Bosnia.  For Operation DENY 
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FLIGHT in 1995, seven MH-53s stationed at Brindisi, Italy, were responsible for CSAR 
in addition to normal special operations missions.47 
Sharing the CSAR duties were the Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(Special Operations Capable) aboard the USS Kearsarge.  The 24th MEU(SOC) was 
positioned near the Croatian coast for execution of Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 
Personnel (TRAP) taskings.  The SOF helicopters were the primary force for night 
operations, while the MEU(SOC) would cover daylight. 
When Basher 52, an F-16 flown by Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down over 
Bosnia, more than 500 missions were flown to search for him.  Although his wingman 
did not witness the ejection and no radio contact had been made, both rescue forces were 
ready to go if called.  Radio contact was established five days later, and the MEU(SOC) 
received the tasking.48  The heavily-armed TRAP force left the Kearsarge two hours later 
and successfully recovered O’Grady. 
Although SOF did not execute the recovery, DENY FLIGHT was another 
example of the air component having to rely upon assets beyond their operational control 
to execute a mission to recover a downed pilot – successfully. 
 
D. ALLIED FORCE 
SOF again would provide CSAR coverage for NATO operations in the Balkans in 
1999. USAF rescue forces covering no-fly operations around Iraq were the most 
deployed units in the Air Force, and had suffered the tragic loss of twelve airmen and two 
helicopters in a training accident in Nevada in September of 1998.49 
During the 79-day air campaign against Serbia, CSAR would play a crucial role.  
The successful rescues conducted by SOF during Operation ALLIED FORCE allowed 
the US government to focus on the operation rather dealing with a crisis over the capture 
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of a US pilot as had happened in Somalia and Bosnia.50  After the campaign was over, 
General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, claimed that “CSAR is 
more precious than stealth.”51 
1. Composition of Rescue Forces 
SOF assets, comprised of MH-53 and MH-60 helicopters; a ground security party 
of Special Tactics PJs and Combat Controllers with Special Forces support; and MC-
130P tankers provided CSAR alert along with RESCORT-designated A-10 Sandys.  The 
helicopters flew forward for alerts from San Vito, Italy, to Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
providing quicker response times.  Operational control of the SOF units remained with 
the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), while the A-10s and other airborne 
support assets (including AWACS, ABCCC, and fighter support) would fall under the 
CFACC.  Once a CSAR mission tasking was accepted by the JSOTF, they passed 
TACON of the recovery assets to the CFACC.  Recognizing the potential for integration 
problems, the helicopters and A-10s conducted CSAR exercises prior to hostilities.  Due 
to limited asset availability, the CFACC did not make C2 aircraft or other fighters 
available to exercise a full CSARTF package.52  
2. Command and Control of Rescue Forces 
The same command structure that had existed during DENY FLIGHT carried 
over into ALLIED FORCE.  The CFACC was designated as the supported commander 
for CSAR operations; the Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC) was located 
within the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vincenza, Italy.53  Recognizing 
the strategic and political implications that a captured airmen could provide the Serbs, the 
CFACC made CSAR his number one priority should an aircraft go down.54 The 
implication was, unlike the instance of Corvette 03 in Iraq, all available air assets would 
be brought to bear to effect a rescue attempt. 
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The PRCC was directed by an Air Force rescue helicopter pilot with no SOF 
support on his staff.  CSAR plans were developed without input from the SOF elements 
that were tasked to conduct the actual missions.55  Fundamental differences in philosophy 
about CSAR tactics between SOF and the USAF combat rescue personnel manning the 
CAOC would inevitably arise during mission execution. 
3. Vega 31 
The myth of stealth aircraft invulnerability came to an abrupt end on the evening 
of 27 March 1999 when an F-117, callsign Vega 31, was shot down by an SA-3.  While 
Serb television was broadcasting images of the wreckage to a world audience, CSAR 
crews were scrambling to find the pilot.  The helicopters, having just arrived at Tuzla, 
quickly refueled and launched toward the Serb border.56  In a situation similar to Iraq, the 
crews had pre-planned “spider routes” that would allow them to operate inside Serb 
airspace and save precious minutes of flight planning.57  The helicopters requested 
permission from the CAOC to execute the recovery without waiting for a CSARTF to be 
assembled – the single-unit method typically preferred by special operations units.  The 
PRCC, without special operations representation, advised waiting until a CSARTF was 
ready, the normal method of employment within combat rescue.58  Frustrated, the 
helicopters – an MH-60 escorted by two MH-53s – orbited while the CAOC gathered the 
package. 
The CAOC, however, was unaware that the helicopters were airborne.  They 
quickly received a request from a flight of US F-15Cs to target some unknown 
helicopters flying near the Serb border.  After some confusion, they were properly 
identified as the three-ship awaiting mission execution.  The lead MH-53s transponder 
had not given the correct reply to the fighter’s interrogation system and the results could 
have been disastrous.59 
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The Sandys had developed their own plan.  They intended to send two flights of 
A-10s in; the first would locate and authenticate the pilot, while the second would escort 
the helicopters in.  The timing would require the helicopters to launch as the second flight 
came off their tanker and was ready to proceed into Serbia.60 
The first flight, led by Sandy 30, verified the survivor’s position, and indicated 
that conditions were favorable for a pickup.  By this time, the helicopters had been 
airborne for ninety minutes and were beginning to run low on fuel.  The execution plan 
was held while an MC-130P rendezvoused on the border and topped off the helicopters.61   
Once refueled, the helicopters pressed in to the survivor’s location.  Due to low 
clouds, the A-10s were unable to provide RESCORT to the ground-hugging helicopters.  
Despite an array of hostile fire, the rescue forces located the downed pilot and had him 
back in friendly hands as the sun was rising.62 
In the aftermath of the Vega 31 mission, the JSOTF made numerous efforts to 
smooth out mission execution issues within the PRCC and CAOC, including placing SOF 
crewmembers flying onboard the ABCCC to serve as a CSAR liaison.63 
4. Hammer 34 
A similar scenario played out two months later when Hammer 34, an F-16, was 
struck by an SA-3, damaging its engine.  The pilot remained with the aircraft until the 
engine failed, ejecting approximately 20 miles south of the enemy SAM.  His wingman 
made contact with him and remained in the area as On-Scene Commander (OSC).64 
The PRCC relayed the information to the alert forces, which launched 
immediately.  Again, the package was composed of an MH-60 and two MH-53 
helicopters, with Special Tactics and SF aboard.65  Based on their experience with Vega 
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31, the rescue package pressed into Serbia without waiting for RESCORT.  They 
searched various locations as coordinates were updated for nearly an hour until the OSC 
finally vectored them to the survivor, 17 miles away.66 
After spotting the pilot’s infrared beacon, the MH-60 landed and the PJs brought 
Hammer 34 on board.  The helicopters made their way back through enemy fire and all 
hands returned safely.67 
While the two recoveries successfully penetrated a well-trained, well-equipped air 
defense system and rescued two downed pilots, it is evident that there were problems 
with coordination.  The majority of these stemmed from the interface between the PRCC 
and the special operations component. 
The main issue was a lack of special operations expertise within the PRCC.  
Although there was a difference in philosophy regarding the composition of the rescue 
package needed for execution, the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) provided 
to the air component was never manned sufficiently to assist the PRCC.68  Better 
integration in the planning effort and support during ongoing operations would have 




As SOF rapidly built-up in the late 1980s, it did so at the expense of the dedicated 
CSAR force.  When Iraq invaded Kuwait, SOF was the only viable option to provide 
theater CSAR.  This situation continued throughout the 1990s, where special operations 
forces in the Balkans again sat alert and made two successful rescues.  The Air Force was 
in the process of slowly rebuilding its rescue assets, but these forces had their hands full 
supplying continuous CSAR coverage of the no-fly zones in Iraq.  The JSRC had settled 
firmly into the CAOC, and had formed a habitual TACON relationship with SOF 
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supporting CSAR alert.  Things changed dramatically in 2001 however, as both SOF and 
Combat Rescue found themselves in the midst of a new kind of fight. 
 
21 
III. THE “NEW” ENVIRONMENT: CURRENT PERSONNEL 
RECOVERY IN THE GWOT 
It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly 
on the ground, at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us 
that smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—have for 
centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow 
chaos. … We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the 
mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. 
  Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 18 July 2007.70 
In the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US Air Force found 
itself facing almost no air threat in Afghanistan, and an enemy it had flown over daily for 
more than a decade in Iraq.  The air component’s need for CSAR rapidly dwindled, while 
new, unexpected missions presented themselves.  Rescue forces adapted quickly, 
however, applying their unique capabilities to the growing number of requests from other 
components.  The continuing requirement to provide CSAR alert for the air component 
led to long periods of inactivity and frustration among the crews, who were on search of a 
way to contribute to the overall campaign. 
 
A. ENDURING FREEDOM 
Despite the Secretary of Defense’s intense interest in getting CSAR forces in 
position before beginning ENDURING FREEDOM, the actual forces that arrived in 
Uzbekistan in October to provide CSAR capability were from SOCCENT, and not 
CENTAF.71  Task Force DAGGER in Uzbekistan and Task Force K-BAR in the south 
were responsible for CSAR missions as well as their typical complement of special 
operations.72  Air Force combat rescue forces, tied to large Air Expeditionary Force 
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logistics packages and low on the airlift priority list, would not arrive to relieve SOF of 
the CSAR tasking until well over a month later.73 
1. Command and Control of Rescue Forces 
Command and control functioned through the Joint Search and Rescue Center 
(JSRC), located within the CENTAF CAOC at Prince Sultan AB, Saudi Arabia.  The 
CFACC was still the supported commander for PR operations, and SOCCENT still 
retained operational control of their CSAR assets.  Once combat rescue units arrived, 
they were under the direct control of the JSRC, which also functioned as the RCC for the 
air component.  Requests from other components traveled from the respective component 
RCC to the JSRC, who then had tasking authority.  This was a legacy relationship from 
years of enforcing the no-fly zones. 
2. Operations 
Facing a decided lack of air defenses, PR missions in support of the air 
component were non-existent.  It wasn’t until January that the first tasking came for a 
recovery; an Australian SF soldier injured by a land mine was evacuated by an HH-60.74  
This was credited as the first combat save by USAF combat rescue forces since 
Vietnam.75 
In fact, the first 14 missions flown by combat rescue forces were to evacuate 
injured coalition forces, primarily SOF.76  Although there was little need for the rescue 
forces by the CFACC, the on-call capabilities of the HH-60s and HC-130Ps proved 
useful to SOCCENT on several occasions.  During Operation ANACONDA, HH-60s 
evacuated several critically injured soldiers from the fighting.  The rescue crews knew 
very little about the operation and their capabilities had not been considered during the 
planning of Anaconda.  Inclusion on the plan would have given rescue forces time to plan 
routings through the rugged Shah-e-Kot mountain range, appropriate fuel and weapon 
loads, and other contingencies prior to being alerted.  More importantly, it would have 
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allowed rescue forces to provide input to the ground commander as to their potential 
contribution to the operation should anything go wrong.77 
On the night of 12 June 2002, rescue crews were alerted in response to an aircraft 
crash.  Chariot 55, a SOCCENT MC-130H, had crashed on departure from a dirt strip in 
Afghanistan.  With AC-130 support overhead and a recently inserted Special Forces team 
on the ground, HH-60s and an HC-130P evacuated the entire crew to a Coalition medical 
facility.78 
The ability of the HH-60s to fly on low-illumination nights with refueling support 
made them very attractive for MEDEVAC missions.  Of the 43 combat missions flown 
through June 2003, 32 were at the request of the Army’s CJTF 180 (now CJTF 76), 
whose helicopters had very limited low-visibility capabilities and were restricted from 
flying in low-illumination conditions.79  Most of these missions were for Afghan 
nationals and Afghan National Army members who were injured or in urgent need of 
medical assistance, and although these were not “traditional” rescue missions, they 
increased the Afghans’ trust in the Coalition forces. 
  
B. IRAQI FREEDOM 
In February 2003 – for the first time since Vietnam – USAF combat rescue crews 
arrived in theater prior to the start of hostilities and were tasked as the primary CSAR 
force.  The largest JSRC in history presided over the massive air operation.  When major 
combat operations ceased, five CFACC aircraft had been lost – one to enemy action.  
Two crews were recovered; one was found by ground forces, and the other by combat 
rescue.80   
1. Composition of Rescue Forces 
Three main rescue task forces were set up, each consisting of HH-60s, HC/MC-
130Ps, and PJs.  One was located in Jordan with counter-Scud forces, which later quickly 
                                                 
77 dePalo, 8. 
78 Michael W. Wooley, “America’s Quiet Professionals: Specialized Airpower – Yesterday, Today, 
and Tomorrow,” Air and Space Power Journal (Spring 2005) : 60. 
79 dePalo, 11. 
80 Darrel D. Whitcomb, “Rescue Operations in the Second Gulf War,” Air and Space Power Journal 
(Spring 2005) : 97. 
24 
moved forward into Iraq at H-1 and Baghdad.  Another was in Kuwait with the bulk of 
the ground forces, and subsequently moved into Iraq at Tallil.  The third was in Turkey, 
covering operations in support of the Kurdish north.81   
2.  Command and Control of Rescue Forces 
The same CAOC facilities used for ENDURING FREEDOM were also used for 
IRAQI FREEDOM.  The CFACC and JSRC were responsible for conducting both 
operations.  Given the lack of air threat in Afghanistan and the large number of rescue 
forces present around Iraq (and in the JSRC), the focus was clearly on the IRAQI 
FREEDOM air operations.82 
3. Junker 14 
On 1 April 2003, an F-14 crew ejected approximately 70 miles north of the Saudi 
Arabian border after experiencing mechanical failure.  Two HH-60s launched out of their 
forward alert base at ArAr and proceeded to the crew’s location with A-10 RESCORT.  
The crew was picked up and returned to ArAr uneventfully, where they boarded an HC-
130P for Kuwait and return to the USS Kitty Hawk.  This was the first rescue mission 
ever flown by USAF combat rescue forces to recover a downed CFACC crew behind 
enemy lines.  It also remains the only one of its kind to date.83 
4. Other Operations 
On 23 March, SOCCENT again found the immediate response capability of alert 
CSAR forces useful.  A rescue task force of HH-60s, A-10s, and an HC-130P scrambled 
to recover critically wounded personnel in an Army SF team trapped near Baghdad.  The 
same scenario occurred again on 7 April when a similar rescue package recovered 
another compromised SF team.84 
SOCCENT returned the favor the following week.  After an F-15E crashed near 
Mosul, killing the crew, an SF team recovered the bodies and brought them to a forward 
alert base, where they were returned to Kuwait onboard an HC-130P.85 
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The end of major combat operations in Iraq saw the majority of rescue forces 
redeploy home, although a small contingent remained.  The need for their services, 
however, was low: zero mission taskings between April and October of 2004, and only 
seven total that resulted in lives saved.  None were in support of air component 
missions.86  Even the call for MEDEVAC, so frequent in Afghanistan, was rare: the 
Army had no illumination restrictions in the flat terrain of Iraq, and had hundreds of 
helicopters available.87  Despite the lack of opportunities, the requirement for USAF 
rescue helicopters in Iraq remains to this day. 
Although rescue forces finally were able to demonstrate their abilities in combat 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, they quickly discovered that the traditional missions that they 
had trained for were rare at best.  The majority were in support of other components that 
relied upon the quick reaction times, long range, and technical capabilities of combat 
rescue forces for emergency exfiltration and MEDEVAC.  These new missions were 
eagerly embraced by the rescue crews, but met with some resistance within the CAOC as 
they detracted from their doctrinal role of supporting downed aircrew.88 
   
C. OEF-PHILIPPINES/OEF-HORN OF AFRICA 
These two operations are notable for two reasons: one, they lack a large US 
combat presence; and two, they are viewed largely as successful examples of how the 
Long War should proceed.  CENTCOM commander General John Abizaid called the 
Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) “a model for how 
military forces might operate across the wider CENTCOM region in the future.”89 
Also noteworthy is the employment of Combat Rescue forces in both operations, 
which are devoid of Air Force strike aircraft.  HH-60s from the 33 RQS at Kadena AB, 
Japan, were detailed to CJTF-510 in the Philippines to augment MEDEVAC capability.  
In an interesting reversal from past operations where SOF performed CSAR, Pacific Air 
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Forces maintained OPCON of the rescue forces, but gave TACON to SOF.90  Figure 2 
shows the command and control arrangement that existed between SOCPAC and PACAF 
forces.  HC-130s currently maintain a “CSAR alert” for CJTF-HOA in Djibouti; in 
reality, they are refueling USMC CH-53 helicopters and providing opportune airlift 
across the region.  Neither operation calls for traditional CSAR support, but the needs of 
the task forces and the capabilities of the rescue forces are marrying up in more 
innovative ways that support a broader interpretation of Personnel Recovery.  If these 
low-visibility task force operations are indeed a model for the future, then the supporting 
PR tasks they require should provide a model for future PR employment. 
 
Figure 2.   Command and Control Structure, OEF-P91 
 
D. AIRCRAFT LOSS RATES 
The Vietnam War represented the heyday of CSAR – many of the tactics (and 
aircraft) developed under fire in Southeast Asia are still in use today.  The combat 
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environment, however, could not be more different than what air forces face today.  The 
USAF alone lost 2255 aircraft during the course of the Vietnam conflict; 1737 of these 
were combat losses.92  Given that more than five million sorties were flown over 
Southeast Asia, the loss rate per 1000 sorties was a relatively low .431.  This was much 
lower than in previous conflicts (see Table 1).  This number is misleading, however, as it 
includes all sorties flown over the region, including South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.  
If one considers only those sorties flown over defended enemy airspace – North Vietnam 
during ROLLING THUNDER – the loss rate jumps to 3.12.   
 
  Sorties Losses 
Rate/1000 
sorties 
WWII  2362800 22948 9.712 
Korea  710886 1466 2.062 
Vietnam  5226701 2255 0.431 
     
Table 1.   Comparison of USAAF/USAF Wartime Loss Rates 
 
In contrast, aircraft losses in more recent major regional conflicts has dropped 
sharply and remained low (see Figure 3).  During low-intensity or “irregular” conflicts, it 
has virtually disappeared.  In the past 30 years, only 18 USAF aircraft have been shot 
down in combat – one over Libya, 13 in DESERT STORM, one in DENY FLIGHT, two 
in ALLIED FORCE, and one in IRAQI FREEDOM.93 
 
                                                 
92 John Schlight, A War Too Long: The History of the USAF in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975, 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 103. 
93 Multiple refs: Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 259; DiPaolo, 2-82, 2-98; 
US Central Air Forces, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers,” Report, 30 April 2003, 3. 
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Figure 3.   Loss Rates During Major Regional Conflicts 
 
That these losses are so low, even against fairly sophisticated Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) air defense systems, is testament to the efficacy of USAF equipment and 
training, and the result of several tactical and technological innovations.  Among these 
are: 
Stealth: The ability of F-117 and B-2 bombers to strike heavily defended targets 
made them indispensable during the early stages of the Iraqi campaigns, and the F-22 is 
expected to extend that capability into the counter-air regime.  Although not invisible to 
radar (as evidenced by the loss of Vega 31 over Serbia), stealth technology has greatly 
reduced the vulnerability of strike aircraft to SAMs, the leading cause of recent 
shootdowns.94 
Precision Weaponry: The increased use of “smart” weapons has vastly decreased 
the number of sorties required to strike an individual target, and reduced the requirement 
for more dangerous low-altitude weapons delivery.  It would require 108 B-17s manned 
by 1080 airmen to achieve the same effects as a single strike aircraft in DESERT 
                                                 
94 Daniel L. Haulman, “USAF Manned Aircraft Combat Losses 1990-2002,”  (Research Paper, Air 
Force Historical Research Agency, 9 December 2002), 4. 
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STORM.95  This has capability has been further enhanced by GPS-enabled munitions like 
the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).  A single B-2 can drop 80 JDAMs on a single 
pass against multiple targets.96  The net effect is that far fewer aircraft are required to 
penetrate hostile airspace to strike a particular target and less likely to be shot down. 
Standoff/Unmanned Systems:  Similarly, the ability of Tomahawk ship-
launched cruise missiles and armed unmanned systems like the Predator and Reaper to 
effectively attack targets has directly removed their human operators from danger.  
Future unmanned combat systems would likely be used in the highest-threat areas; the 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report estimated that 45% of future long-range strike 
assets would be unmanned.97 
Attacking the Air Defense:  A robust combination of electronic jamming, anti-
radiation missiles, and strikes against airfields and SAMs has quickly degraded enemy air 
defense systems in recent conflicts.  Destruction of command and control nodes has left 
the remaining anti-aircraft systems operating autonomously, severely hampering their 
ability to overcome aircraft countermeasures and defensive tactics.98 
Threat Avoidance:  Simply flying above the effective altitude of air defenses has 
also reduced losses.  After suffering a large number of losses conducting low-altitude 
airfield attacks in DESERT STORM, Coalition aircraft ceased employing low-level 
tactics.99  A related capability is the extensive use of night vision equipment to degrade 
the air defense use of optically acquired or guided systems. 
While these factors are sure to be countered somewhat by parallel advances in air 
defense technology, they point to a fundamental change in the application of air power 
since Vietnam: the USAF expects to immediate gain air superiority over hostile airspace, 
                                                 
95 Richard P. Hallion, “Precision Weapons, Power Projection, and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” 
(USAF Air Armament Summit.  Eglin AFB, FL, 26 May 1999;  available from https://www.airforcehistory. 
hq.af.mil/EARS/Hallion papers/precisionweaponspower.htm; Internet, accessed 5 June 2007. 
96 “Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU- 31/32/38 factsheet,”  US Air Force, [website]; available from 
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=108; Internet; accessed 7 October 2007.  
97 QDR Report, 46. 
98 Haulman, 14. 
99 Clancy, 353. 
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then operate with relative impunity for the duration of the conflict.  This assumption has 
been borne out by the loss rates in recent campaigns.   
This low loss rate has two possible outcomes for personnel recovery forces 
assigned to the air component.  If the cost of maintaining these forces outweighs their 
perceived utility (which could be considered low if rarely utilized), then they may be 
substantially reduced or eliminated.  This would leave the air component unable to 
provide support to the other components – hampering ongoing operations in the near 
term, and forcing the reconstruction of the missing capability elsewhere in the long term.  
This would likely recreate the reliance upon SOF – to the detriment of other SOF 
missions – that occurred during the 1990s.  If the air component (and Air Force in 
particular) maintains a robust recovery capability designed specifically for their own use, 
it would be grossly underutilized, suffering the attendant problems of high OPTEMPO 
and frustration that have plagued operations in Iraq.  Within the construct of the Global 
War on Terrorism, PR forces are pragmatically examining ways to make themselves 
more relevant.  One current proposal from the PR community envisions using rescue 
assets as a global humanitarian search and rescue force, providing a benevolent military 
presence in foreign countries in an effort to shape local perceptions of the US100  The 
potential impact of these two outcomes is impossible to evaluate without understanding 
the future environmental context within which PR forces will operate. 
 
E. PREDICTING THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT 
The best estimate of future US military requirements comes from the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR).  The 2006 report called for a series of sweeping changes to 
better position the Department of Defense to handle current and future Irregular Warfare 
threats, noting that enemies “are more likely to pose asymmetric threats, including 
irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges.”101  Among the proposed changes were 
major growth in SOF and an expanded role for General Purpose Forces (GFP) in 
                                                 
100 Marc C. DiPaolo and others, “A Rescue Force for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities 
of the Long War,” Air and Space Power Journal (Fall 2007) : 79. 
101 QDR Report, 19. 
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Irregular Warfare.102  While it does not dismiss the possibility of conventional threats 
from other nation-states, the foundational thinking of senior leadership emphasizes a shift 
toward non-state, networked adversaries and operating within states with which we are 
not at war – traits characteristic of Irregular Warfare.103 
Another important outcome of the 2005 QDR process was the directive to create 
an Irregular Warfare “roadmap” to guide the implementation of decisions regarding IW.  
The resultant IW roadmap led directly to the creation of the Irregular Warfare Joint 
Operating Concept (IW JOC), the first attempt to provide JFCs with guidance on 
developing IW strategy and prosecuting an extended campaign.104  The IW JOC is now 
the foundation for defining IW and its constitutive activities and tasks. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
While Personnel Recovery efforts in the past decade have focused on CSAR of 
downed aircrews, evidence demonstrates that the actual need is very small.  During 
unconventional, or “irregular” warfare, it becomes virtually obsolete.  The experience of 
Combat Rescue forces in operations since 9/11 have shown a shift toward a broader 
conception of Personnel Recovery that involves MEDEVAC of contractors and local 
civilians as well as combatants, and exfiltration and refueling support of SOF.  US 
strategy has acknowledged a similar shift toward IW, where previous assumptions of 
linear battlefields and visible enemies lose applicability.  To employ rescue forces 
effectively in this new environment– and to imagine the proper role of Personnel 
Recovery – requires an analysis of Irregular Warfare and the application of airpower 
therein. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE TASKS 
Increasingly sophisticated irregular methods – e.g., terrorism and 
insurgency – challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing 
irregular methods aim to erode US influence, patience, and political will. 
Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose 
prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United 
States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action. … 
Our experiences in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our 
military forces to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively. 
2005 National Defense Strategy 
The IW JOC defines Irregular Warfare as a “violent struggle among state and 
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations,” adding that 
IW “favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and 
will.”105  The IW JOC emphasizes the new, more politicized warfare environment where 
the use of force can be counterproductive, and traditional models of military engagement 
that disregard the population are obsolete.106 
 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TASKS 
While “conventional” or “regular” warfare tasks involve destroying enemy forces 
or degrading a state’s capacity to make war, IW focuses on indirect methods of 
employment.  The activities that comprise IW are: 
• Insurgency 
• Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
• Unconventional warfare (UW) 
• Terrorism 
• Counterterrorism (CT) 
• Foreign internal defense (FID) 
• Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) 
• Strategic communications 
                                                 
105 IW JOC, 6. 
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• Psychological operations (PSYOP) 
• Information operations (IO) 
• Civil-military operations (CMO) 
• Intelligence and counterintelligence activities 
• Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms 
dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW 
• Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries107 
 
While many of these mission areas have, in the past, been the domain of special 
operations, a key supporting idea elucidated in the IW JOC and QDR is the need for the 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) to take on more SOF roles in IW.  Of particular relevance 
here are the needs for GPF to support distributed IW operations and to conduct and 
support Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations.108  Historically, these are areas where 
airpower has made its greatest contributions to IW, and will help define where Personnel 
Recovery fits into the overall campaign. 
 
B. AIRPOWER TASKS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
 In addition to the activities listed in the IW JOC, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-
3, Irregular Warfare, provides guidance regarding the application of airpower to the 
problems of IW.  Figure 4 depicts the activities and capabilities of airpower for IW.  This 
includes capabilities of Air Force SOF (AFSOF) as well as conventional forces.  Each 
will be discussed in greater detail below. 
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Figure 4.   Irregular Warfare Model (From AFDD 2-3) 
 
1. Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) 
BPC is designed to improve the performance of the partner nation’s defense 
department; in this case, the air force.  While BPC encompasses security assistance, 
foreign military sales, and foreign internal defense (FID), the FID mission is the primary 
vehicle for assessing, training, advising, and assisting foreign air forces.  The 6th Special 
Operations Squadron is currently the USAF’s only dedicated combat aviation advisory 
unit.  Recently, however, GPF have taken the lead role in training and advising the 
reconstituted Iraqi Air Force.109 
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2. Intelligence 
The Air Force operates an array of air-breathing and space-based assets that 
collect across the intelligence spectrum; when combined with sources of HUMINT, these 
resources provide a powerful enabler for IW operations.  The vast majority of 
reconnaissance platforms in theater are under the control of the air component, including 
armed UAVs, although AFSOC is fielding its own Predator squadron and CIA has 
employed its own assets in the past.  The ability of UAVs to provide persistent, real-time 
imagery for missions in progress has proven invaluable for enhancing the situational 
awareness and effectiveness of friendly forces. 
3. Mobility 
Air mobility in IW encompasses three areas: deployment, sustainment, and 
special operations employment.  GPF have traditionally handled theater deployment and 
sustainment through intra-theater airlift to main and forward airbases, and airdrop to 
remote or inaccessible locations110.  SOF aircraft provide infiltration, exfiltration, and 
resupply of U.S. and partner nation special operations.  Rapid air mobility is often cited 
as a crucial capability for COIN operations, providing government forces an asymmetric 
advantage in speed and mass over insurgents.111   
4. Agile Combat Support (ACS) 
Not to be confused with aerial resupply, ACS is comprised of base support and 
sustainment activities, such as civil engineering, EOD, and medical treatment.  The Air 
Force possesses extensive capability to rapidly build up austere airbases and other 
facilities in preparation for IW activities.  These forces can also provide support to local 
infrastructure projects to improve underlying conditions that might distance the 
population from the government.112 
5. Precision Engagement 
While indiscriminant use of force is likely to aggravate the population, highly 
precise munitions coupled with skilled controllers on the ground and in the air can 
achieve desired effects with minimum impact to the surroundings.  The ability to target,                                                  
110 United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare, (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters US Air Force, 1 August 2007), 41. 
111 R.W. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort,” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, Feb 1972), 52. 
112 AFDD 2-3, 43. 
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track, and strike enemy forces (usually while unobserved) reduces their freedom to move 
and operate, making them an easier target for the government’s security apparatus.113  
However, the effect of these strikes and even the presence itself of US strike aircraft on 
popular opinion must be considered prior to operations.  The AC-130 has traditionally 
supplied precision fire support to SOF; today, such diverse platforms as A-10s, F-15Es, 
and B-52s have the ability to employ precision munitions in support of friendly troops in 
contact. 
6. Command and Control 
The Air Force’s theater air control system has the ability to rapidly collate and 
disseminate information, allowing forces to rapidly react in dynamic environments.  
Utilizing this capability can greatly reduce sensor to shooter time, and help prevent 
instances of confusion and fratricide.114  Although the two are deconflicted, conventional 
air operations are controlled through the CAOC, while SOF aviation is typically under 
the direction of the Joint Special Operations Aviation Component (JSOAC). 
7. Information Operations 
This is a broad mission area that encompasses influence operations, electronic 
warfare, and network warfare, and is an essential component of an IW strategy. 
115Conventional electronic warfare platforms possess jamming, collection, and targeting 
capabilities, while PSYOP typically are performed by SOF aircraft.  While most airlift 
and some fighter aircraft have the ability to drop leaflets, AFSOC EC-130Js have radio 
and television broadcast capability.116  
8. Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
Although not specifically listed as an airpower capability in IW, the ability to 
support UW is addressed as part of supporting insurgencies.  In this capacity, the Air 
Force has the ability to provide support to Special Forces’ conduct of Unconventional 
Assisted Recovery operations,117 as pararescuemen, Combat Rescue Officers, and 
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Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) technicians are all capable of 
conducting or advising indigenous forces in UAR. 
Some of these capabilities span both GPF and SOF, while others can reside more 
distinctly within one or the other.  Figure 5 depicts where these capabilities fall along a 
scale between GPF and SOF. 
SOF
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Figure 5.   Spectrum of Airpower Tasks in IW 
 
The airpower capabilities listed in AFDD 2-3 are directed primarily at COIN 
operations, with some acknowledgement of UW support.  An important area of IW that is 
addressed only in passing, however, is Counterterrorism outside of COIN.  Airpower 
contributions to Counterterrorism are typically envisioned as Precision Engagement, 
reactive kinetic strikes against terrorists or supporting facilities; however, airpower can 
also provide Mobility and Agile Combat Support functions for Counterterrorism, 
particularly in response to a CBRN terrorist attack.  Air component forces possess the 
ability to conduct recovery, treatment, and decontamination operations that may be 
beyond the capability of other first-responder organizations. 
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C. PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASKS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
The IW JOC indicates that PR is one of the areas where GPF can provide support 
to globally distributed IW operations,118 while AFDD 2-3 describes PR as a critical 
COIN support capability.119  Both of these publications point to the applicability of PR in 
IW operations, but there has been little analysis of what PR actually encompasses when 
conducting an IW campaign.  This ad hoc approach to the employment of Combat 
Rescue forces demonstrates an underlying lack of knowledge regarding the PR tasks 
required for IW and the capabilities that rescue forces possess to execute them. 
The 1 June 2005 revision of AFDD 2-1.6, now titled Personnel Recovery, 
acknowledges that while historically focused on the recovery of downed aircrews, 
Combat Rescue forces may be called upon to recover any isolated person, military or 
civilian.  Recovering these isolated persons is the primary mission of dedicated PR 
forces.  Additionally, AFDD 2-1.6 enumerates several collateral missions that fall within 
the capabilities of Combat Rescue forces, including: casualty evacuation, civil SAR, 
counter-drug activities, emergency aeromedical evacuation, homeland security, 
humanitarian relief, international aid, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), 
support for National Aeronautics and Space Administration flight operations, infiltration 
and exfiltration of personnel in support of air component commander missions, and 
special operations missions, including PR of special operations forces.120 
If these collateral missions do not describe the recovery of “any isolated 
personnel”, then it is unclear what the primary mission of Combat Rescue forces is, 
beyond conducting CSAR for downed aircrews.  As previously discussed, the probability 
of such an occurrence in the IW environment is extremely low, particularly when friendly 
troops or populations occupy the majority of the terrain.  What, then, should be the 
mission of Combat Rescue forces in an Irregular Warfare campaign? 
Using the employment of Combat Rescue forces in recent operations as a model, 
the list of collateral missions (minus domestic missions) provides a good starting point.  
These collateral missions of Combat Rescue forces – including support to UW recovery 
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operations – and CSAR are grouped according to airpower capabilities in IW and where 
they fall along the GPF-SOF continuum in Figure 6.   
SOF









International Aid Counter-Drug Activities 
Casualty/MEDEVAC   
NEO
Humanitarian Relief        
Infil/exfil for CFACC/SOF
CSAR




Figure 6.   Personnel Recovery Tasks in Irregular Warfare 
 
What should be apparent from this depiction is not that PR should be a SOF 
mission; rather, it shows that many of the tasks that PR forces will be expected to 
perform in an IW campaign fall outside of the areas that the air component has expertise 
in or control over. 
 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY FORCES 
Outside of CSAR, the PR tasks involved with an IW campaign have no bearing 
upon the tactical employment of air assets, which is the typical concern of the air 
component during conflict.  This begs the question: can rescue forces operating under the 
direction of the conventional air component effectively execute the tasks required of them 
in the IW environment?  Anecdotal evidence from recent operations would suggest not.  
However, if the air component can embrace the larger construct of PR that exists beyond 
CSAR, then the prognosis is good.  If not, then alternate command and control 
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arrangements that have proven effective might point the way for successful employment 
of Combat Rescue forces in future IW operations. 
Despite an expanded view of who is at risk for isolation, Air Force doctrine for 
Personnel Recovery is still based upon CSAR.  Whether ejecting from an aircraft or 
encountering an IED, an isolated person is assumed to be behind enemy lines and the 
clock is ticking on their recovery.  The emphasis on immediate response in an uncertain 
environment perpetuates the reliance on a large CSARTF package to fight their way in 
and out of the recovery area.  This concept had evolved out of necessity in Vietnam, 
where daylight operations allowed enemy forces to accurately target aircraft and see 
where a pilot parachuted into the jungle, necessitating a rapid response to prevent 
capture.  Daylight recoveries also made the rescue helicopters extremely vulnerable to 
hostile ground fire.  The solution was to bring helicopters into the area as quickly as 
possible, with enough supporting firepower to suppress enemy fire until the rescue was 
complete.121   
Special operations forces, however, relied upon avoiding detection to survive.  
Flying low-level at night in small packages, literally “below the radar,” on thoroughly-
planned missions, SOF conducted operations that included the raid on the Son Tay prison 
camp.122  This contrast in philosophy was particularly evident later in ALLIED FORCE, 
where SOF recovery assets, used to operating alone, were held at the Serb border at the 
CAOC’s direction until A-10s could be refueled and marshaled to provide cover for the 
helicopters.123   
The Irregular Warfare environment presents several challenges to Air Force PR 
doctrine.  First, it removes the linear nature of the battlefield, making enemy lines not 
only fluid, but often indistinguishable.  Allied forces may occupy much of the contested 
territory, and be in a much better position to provide immediate recovery of an isolated 
person than air assets.  Second, it inserts an impressionable civilian population of 
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questionable loyalty into a formerly “sterile” combat environment, where it is no longer 
possible to shoot first, and ask questions later.124  In some cases, it may be more 
strategically advantageous to delay a recovery until it can be accomplished in a less 
conspicuous area or by a local force, particularly if the presence of US aircraft would 
inflame the population.  Third, it puts the support requirements of other components on 
par with – or even above – the need to rescue its own forces.  The assumption that the air 
component should be the focal point of theater PR operations – as it has during the major 
air campaigns since 1990 – is undermined by the COIN focus on human interactions on 
the ground and a reduction in air threats. 
This is not to say that the air component cannot conduct effective COIN support 
or other IW tasks; it merely points to the diminished offensive role of airpower in IW, 
and the need to evaluate how it provides support to the other components.  Close air 
support of friendly troops continues to be a critical COIN capability, for example, and it 
is a mission that the air component executes well.  PR, however, is different: the air 
component is providing support for itself as well as the other components.  This leads to a 
question of self-interest and priority.  If the doctrine names CSAR as the primary 
function of Combat Rescue forces, can the air component be equally supportive of the 
other PR tasks of IW, which potentially diverts assets away from CSAR and places 
aircrews at risk? 
Possibly.  Government organizations are remarkably resistant to taking on new 
tasks that do not fit with their existing culture.125  The same Air Force cultural tradition 
that ties PR doctrine to Vietnam demands that CSAR will be there to pick up downed 
aircrews.  The Air Force Chief of Staff called CSAR a “moral and ethical imperative” 
that is “directly linked to the combat air forces and the personnel they support,” and 
named the acquisition of a new CSAR helicopter as the second highest Air Force budget 
priority.126  Training requirements for Combat Rescue crews are based entirely upon 
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CSAR operations in hostile territory.  So long as the possibility of a conventional air 
campaign against another nation exists, the Air Force will maintain a focus on CSAR as a 
strategic means of risk mitigation.  IW will still be considered the “lesser included case” 
for rescue forces. 
The examples of OEF-P and CJTF-HOA, however, show at least some 
acknowledgement by the Air Force of the positive contributions that Combat Rescue can 
make in a theater IW campaign, albeit where there is no air component CSAR 
requirement.  The transition from air campaign to IW in IRAQI FREEDOM appears to 
have been more problematic; it took substantial time for the decreased CSAR 
requirement to translate into more constructive uses of the LD/HD rescue assets.  
 
E. SUMMARY 
While the activities that comprise Irregular Warfare lie outside of traditional 
employment methods, airpower can make significant contributions to an IW campaign.  
The asymmetric advantages in rapid mobility are especially valuable when conducting 
COIN operations.  Similarly, Personnel Recovery support to IW looks significantly 
different from normal conceptions of theater CSAR.  The ability of Combat Rescue 
forces to provide a wide spectrum of direct and indirect support to the theater IW 
campaign, from MEDEVAC of wounded local civilians to in extremis recovery of SOF, 
gives the JFC or JTF commander a very flexible and rapid reaction airpower tool.  This 
wider conception of the PR umbrella still includes traditional CSAR support of downed 
aircrews, but the demand for CSAR in the IW environment is much lower than for other, 
equally important PR tasks. 
The ability of the air component to execute those tasks is suspect when there is a 
perceived need for dedicated CSAR, as service-based PR doctrine has fostered an 
inevitable self-interest to rescue one’s own forces first and foremost.  However, in 
theaters where the air presence, particularly the offensive airpower presence, is small, 
Combat Rescue forces have been gainfully employed by Joint Task Forces, performing a 
multitude of “collateral” PR tasks in support of Irregular Warfare operations.  This 
difference in airpower focus should be mirrored in the command structure under which 
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Combat Rescue forces operate, shifting from the air component to the theater agency best 















Personnel recovery needs to transform because warfare, as we know it is 
transforming. Fourth generation netcentric warfare, framed by 
globalization, transnational groups, and mobile, decentralized operations 
with no definitive front, place new and greater challenges on our military 
commanders. 
Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, Joint Staff Director of Operations 
14 September, 2004.127 
USAF Combat Rescue forces provide a highly skilled and versatile tool for the 
JFC in an IW campaign, rapidly able to execute a wide variety of PR tasks in support of 
overall strategy.  The Combat Rescue force, however, is small in numbers; extended alert 
deployments in the 1990s stretched the force very thin.  Proper employment requires 
careful consideration of where and how these units should be incorporated into theater 
forces for the conduct of Irregular Warfare while still maintaining the capability to 
support CSAR coverage of conventional air campaigns. 
 
A. WHERE SHOULD PERSONNEL RECOVERY ASSETS BE EMPLOYED 
IN IRREGULAR WARFARE? 
Combat Rescue forces are likely already in place where a major air campaign has 
preceded or occurred in conjunction with an IW campaign, as was the case in both 
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.  Once the air offensive has slowed and 
friendly troops occupy territory, then the role and composition of PR assets must be re-
evaluated.  Combat Rescue forces have the ability to operate over long distances in 
difficult terrain in marginal weather conditions; this capability lent itself to nighttime 
MEDEVAC and exfiltration missions in ENDURING FREEDOM.  In Iraq, however, the 
generally low terrain and prevalence of friendly helicopter refueling bases erased Combat 
Rescue’s comparative edge over other assets.128  Accordingly, the majority of Combat 
Rescue forces were redeployed after major combat operations terminated.  Problems 
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arose for the remaining crews when they were still tied to the conventional CSAR 
requirement long after the environment had shifted to an IW campaign, and their 
expertise was not utilized for evolving PR tasks.  If Combat Rescue forces are not 
integrated into the IW campaign plan, they should be removed from the theater once 
conventional operations cease and CSAR is no longer the primary PR task. 
In operations where there is little or no use of tactical airpower, such as in the 
Philippines and Horn of Africa, Combat Rescue forces should be used in locations where 
they have a comparative advantage in capabilities over other GPF.  This would include 
near- or overwater operations; support of aerial refuelable helicopters (GPF or SOF); 
long-range and austere base operations; employment in countries where the presence of 
SOF may be politically sensitive or objectionable; and areas where immediate field 
medical expertise is widely needed.  In low or medium threat theaters, they may be used 
to backfill or augment SOF lift capabilities.  When operating in an IW environment, the 
“collateral” PR tasks should dictate the size and disposition of Combat Rescue forces in 
theater. 
 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY ASSETS IN 
IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Air Force doctrine on Irregular Warfare provides contradictory guidance for 
command and control of PR assets.  On one hand, doctrine recognizes the need for local 
control, claiming that “[d]ue to the localized nature of most IW enemies and specifically 
insurgencies, decentralized execution is vital to the successful integration of 
airpower.”129  On the other hand, doctrine also requires centralized planning of LD/HD 
assets to prioritize competing demands from multiple operational areas.130  This assumes 
that the theater air component is best suited to determine these priorities and respond 
accordingly.  In campaigns with a robust air presence, the air component’s highest 
priority for PR assets will invariably be CSAR.  As long as Joint doctrine mandates 
individual service responsibility for PR, there is no incentive for the air component to 
altruistically place other component requirements above its own. 
                                                 
129 AFDD 2-3, 66. 
130 Ibid., 70. 
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In IW operations with a small or non-existent air component CSAR requirement, 
control of Combat Rescue forces should be shifted to the agency that can best prioritize 
the PR requirements and has the capability to control assets.  In some cases, this may be a 
SOF element, typically the JSOAC (as was the case in OEF-P) or the maritime 
component if conducting shipboard operations.  For smaller task forces, like CJTF-HOA, 
the JTF/CC, J-3 or other headquarters elements may be able to dictate requirements 
directly.  Similarly, tactical control might best be exercised by an interagency group or 
Embassy mission in the case of humanitarian response or non-combatant evacuations.   
IW campaigns may be of long duration, and the roles and organizations will likely 
change during the course of the operation.  Command and control of PR assets must be 
flexible enough to allow for changes in composition and controlling agencies over time.  
Allowing a single component (currently the air component) to maintain OPCON of 
Combat Rescue forces for the entire operation ensures continuity and centralized 
planning.  The owning component can then detail rescue forces to the user, giving 
TACON to the agency best able to direct the PR tasks necessary for the IW campaign – 
providing decentralized execution. 
 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this thesis and recommendations provide a conceptual analysis of personnel 
recovery within the context of Irregular Warfare, it opens up several other avenues of 
potential exploration.  If indeed demand for “conventional” CSAR is minimal, what 
varying utilities does it provide for senior political leadership (risk management), military 
planners (strategic vulnerabilities), and individual service members (trust, morale)?  Is 
the Department of Defense properly funding CSAR is accordance with this utility?  Is the 
cost of a captured American higher in a conventional conflict, or IW, and what degree of 
risk is acceptable in either situation to attempt to rescue them?  I would submit that the 
images of soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu had a much greater 
impact on U.S. policy than televised aircrew “confessions” on Iraqi television did, and 
that prisoners are far more likely to survive detainment by a foreign government than a 
non-state opposition or terrorist group.  However, many issues regarding CSAR are 
driven by emotions and “moral imperatives” rather than thorough analysis. 
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If the prevalence of IW continues, then there may be a need to institutionalize 
some of the TACON relationships that are established by Combat Rescue forces in 
theater.  If, for instance, CSAR requirements can be filled by SOF when other forces are 
unavailable, could moving Combat Rescue forces under USSOCOM still meet air 
component requirements while alleviating major shortfalls in SOF lift capability?  Again, 
I am inclined to say yes, but there are institutional barriers on both sides that are not 
easily overcome, even if rational cost/benefit analysis were to support such a move. 
Meanwhile, we must face the growing problem of Irregular Warfare with an open 
mind and a willingness to diverge from the authoritative guidance that is doctrine.  
Providing Personnel Recovery outside of a conventional campaign requires a careful 
analysis of the environment, and selecting the right forces to accomplish the tasks at 
hand.  USAF Combat Rescue forces are highly capable and highly flexible – but also 
small in numbers, so their services must be applied to areas where they have a 
comparative advantage over other GPF (or SOF).  Combat Rescue forces should continue 
to be the primary CSAR provider for air-intensive campaigns, lending support to other 
components when directed.  In an IW environment, the other forces available to conduct 
potential PR tasks must be examined prior to bringing Combat Rescue forces into theater 
or extending their deployment.  Substantial GPF presence and benign physical and threat 
environments reduce the comparative utility of Combat Rescue forces.  Areas of limited 
US military presence and demanding physical environments favor the use of Combat 
Rescue forces. 
When those forces are employed in theater, it is crucial that they are responsive to 
the demands of the particular theater.  Passing TACON of Combat Rescue forces to the 
agency best able to prioritize PR tasks and control assets, regardless of component (and 
possibly Department or nation), applies PR capability most effectively and expeditiously.  
Relinquishing control of Combat Rescue forces may be conceptually difficult for the air 
component, but it does have precedent in the Philippines, and may ultimately prove to be 
more effective construct.  In the end, it does not matter what uniform (if any) is worn by 
an aircrew, their commander, or the individuals they carry; what matters is the ability to 




No longer does personnel recovery just mean combat search and rescue.  
It’s the overarching umbrella that encompasses non-conventional assisted 
recovery combat search and rescue, medical evacuation, casualty 
evacuation and non-combatant evacuation operations….One key aspect of 
transformation is to craft a common vision and common goals to unify the 
personnel recovery community. 
Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, Joint Staff Director of Operations 
14 September, 2004.131 
 
This thesis begins with the idea that Personnel Recovery is much larger than 
CSAR, but the two are often envisioned as synonymous.  The Air Force CSAR construct, 
initially realized in Vietnam, continues to focus primarily on the recovery of downed 
aircrews.  Recent history, however has demonstrated two trends that challenge this mode 
of thought. 
The first trend is precipitous drop in aircraft loss rates.  Technology and tactics 
have combined to make the loss of a friendly aircraft an anomaly, even when flying over 
heavily defended territory.  This brings into question the efficacy of dedicating forces 
exclusively for CSAR of aircrews.  The Air Force has adapted somewhat, extending 
CSAR coverage to any friendly personnel and labeling that Personnel Recovery.  
However, that still ignores the reality of the second trend, the increased prevalence of 
Irregular Warfare. 
Countering a global insurgency implies the global conduct of IW, and the 
doctrinal basis for rescue forces – CSAR – is of minimal applicability in the IW 
environment.  While airpower has many important contributions to the theater IW 
campaign, they are largely supporting functions that have little to do with the CAOC-
directed air war.  This has led to a disconnect between the perceived requirement of the 
air component for self-CSAR and the combined force requirement for PR, leaving 
Combat Rescue forces under-utilized in the field.   
                                                 
131 Williams, “Personnel-Recovery System Needs Transformation.” 
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Changing this mindset is a difficult task, as the Air Force still sees its primary 
responsibility as dominating battlespace through application of air, space, and cyber-
power.  IW will remain a lesser included case that relies upon skills developed for 
conducting conventional campaigns, and CSAR will remain the stated purpose for 
Combat Rescue forces.  Recent operations in the Philippines and Horn of Africa, 
however, have demonstrated that Combat Rescue forces can ably execute PR tasks in an 
IW campaign, and provide a glimpse of the future.  The question, then, is what is the 
vision for where and how Combat Rescue forces are best used? 
Due to a lack of numbers, a high ratio of Guard/Reserve units, and the need to 
support possible conventional campaigns, Combat Rescue forces must be applied 
judiciously to IW campaigns.  Experience suggests that operations demanding rapid 
response, specialized lift, and medical capabilities provide the best arena for their skills.  
The demand for those skills may be high, and it is crucial that theater priorities dictate the 
employment of Combat Rescue forces.  The air component may not be in a position to 
evaluate what those priorities are, and if not, alternate command and control 
arrangements are necessary.  If possible, TACON of Combat Rescue forces should be 
provided directly to the agency in theater that is best positioned to determine theater 
priorities with regard to PR tasks and possesses the capability to control assets.  This may 
result in somewhat “unorthodox” arrangements, but puts the full benefit of a flexible 
airpower tool directly in the hands of a knowledgeable user. 
Combat Rescue has made incredible strides since 1990, growing from no effective 
combat capability during DESERT STORM to the highly effective and professional 
CSAR force that leapfrogged into Baghdad during IRAQI FREEDOM.  Maintaining a 
high level of CSAR capability will remain a fundamentally important mission for Combat 
Rescue.  However, the world has changed much during the intervening years, and the 
environment in which wars are fought has changed with it.  To remain effective, we must 
recognize the challenges of providing Personnel Recovery in the IW environment, and 
embrace a wider vision of Combat Rescue’s contribution to achieving the JFC’s goals.  
Just as CSAR evolved out of the jungles of Southeast Asia, Personnel Recovery must 
adapt to the new realities that exist in Irregular Warfare, and build upon the successes of 
recent years. 
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